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Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, 
we analyze a simple game called the ‘chopstick auction’ in which bidders are confronted with 
the exposure problem. We do so both in theory and in a laboratory experiment. In theory, the 
chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second-price 
sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, 
we find that the chopstick auction is less efficient than the second-price sealed-bid auction 
and that it yields more [the same] revenue if bidders are inexperienced [experienced]. 
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July 14, 2006 1 Introduction
Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by what is called the ￿exposure problem￿ .
We speak of an exposure problem when bidders aim at winning several units but are
exposed to the risk of buying too few as competition on some of these units turns out to
be tougher than expected.1 Several economists have argued that the exposure problem
in auction should be prevented as it leads to an ine¢ cient outcome of the auction and
to low revenue. In this paper, we will investigate whether these claims are true, using a
laboratory experiment.
Economic theory sketches a mixed picture about both claims. Theoretical papers
by Robert Rosenthal and coauthors include situations in which the exposure problem is
present. Szentes and Rosenthal (2003ab) ￿nd e¢ cient equilibria in multi-unit auctions
of homogeneous objects. However, Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) and Rosenthal and
Wang (1996) construct ine¢ cient equilibria in the case of heterogeneous objects. In these
papers, the authors analyze multi-unit auctions with two types of bidders, namely ￿local￿
bidders who are interested in only one object, and ￿global￿bidders who try to acquire
several. The global bidders, in competition with the local ones, face the exposure problem
when attempting to realize synergies between the objects. In line with this, Bykowsky
et al. (2000) give an illustrative example in which the equilibrium outcome is such that
either the allocation is ine¢ cient or at least one of the bidders ends up paying more for
the purchased items than they are worth to her.
Other theorists have investigated the relationship between e¢ ciency and revenue. For
auctions of perfectly divisible objects, Ausubel and Cramton (1999) show that e¢ ciency
of the auction outcome is necessary for revenue maximization when the auction is followed
by a perfect resale market and when the seller cannot commit to not selling some units.
However, usually there is a trade-o⁄between e¢ ciency and revenue. In Myerson￿ s (1981)
model, the seller maximizes his expected revenue by imposing a reserve price and hence
1See also Bykowsky et al. (2000), and Milgrom (2000).
2excluding bidders with low values from winning the object so that the outcome is not
necessarily e¢ cient. Milgrom (2000) constructs an example in which there is a trade-o⁄
between e¢ ciency and revenue in the case of multi-unit auctions: the seller realizes a less
e¢ cient outcome when using larger packages but gets a higher revenue.
In practice, it is also not clear whether the exposure problem is a major issue. At least
Klemperer (2002) does not include the warning ￿avoid the exposure problem￿in his list
of issues that are of practical importance in the design of (multi-unit) auctions. However,
Van Damme (1999) claims that the exposure problem led to low bids and an ine¢ cient
outcome in the Dutch DCS-1800 auction. In February 1998, the Dutch government auc-
tioned licenses for second generation mobile telecommunication using an auction with
almost the same rules as the FCC auctions in the US.2 A di⁄erence between the Dutch
DCS-1800 auction and the American auctions was that in the American auctions, the ex-
posure problem was not seriously present as bidders were allowed to withdraw their bids.
Van Damme argues that the FCC auction format would have lead to a higher revenue
and a more e¢ cient outcome.
Does the exposure problem indeed lead to ine¢ cient outcomes and low revenues? In
order to answer this question, we designed a laboratory experiment in which we confronted
subjects with a simple auction game called ￿the chopstick auction￿(CSA).3 In this auc-
tion, a seller simultaneously sells three chopsticks. There are 2 bidders in the auction,
who independently submit a bid, which is the price for one chopstick. Call the second
highest bid p. The outcome of CSA is such that the highest bidder gets two chopsticks
for a price of 2p and the second highest bidder gets one chopstick for p. We compared
CSA with the second-price sealed-bid auction (SPSB) in which two chopsticks are sold
as one bundle. The only di⁄erence with the ￿usual￿second-price sealed-bid auction is
that the winning bidder has to pay the second highest bid twice, once for each chopstick.
2See McMillan (1994), Cramton (1995, 1998), McAfee and McMillan (1996), and Milgrom (2000) for
descriptions and discussions of these auctions.
3The credit for the name of this auction game goes to Mary Lucking-Reiley. Thanks to Balasz Szentes
and Robert Rosenthal for pointing this out to us.
3We examine bidding behavior in CSA and in SPSB in the following setting. Bidder i￿ s
(i = 1;2) marginal values are zero on the ￿rst chopstick, vi on the second, and zero on
the third. The signals vi are independently drawn from the same distribution. Because
the second highest bidder wins a worthless chopstick for a positive price, bidders face the
exposure problem in CSA.
CSA is never used in practice, but in our context, it is a good proxy for the uniform
price auction and the simultaneous ascending auction. Some governments sell treasury
bills using the uniform price auction,4 and the FCC auctions in the US and some of the
UMTS auctions in Europe were of the simultaneous ascending auction type.5 CSA has
the advantage over the other two auction formats that it is easier to implement in the
lab because of its simplicity. To see why CSA is a good proxy for the uniform price
auction and the simultaneous ascending auction, ￿rst, imagine that the three chopsticks
are sold in a uniform price auction in which the highest three bids win, and the fourth bid
determines the price. For both bidders, it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid the same
amount on two chopsticks. Bidding positive amounts on only one chopstick or all three
chopsticks is obviously not optimal. Moreover, any strategy that prescribes di⁄erent bids
is weakly dominated by bidding the lowest of the two amounts on two chopsticks. The
outcome of the uniform price auction in which bidders bid b on two objects is then the
same as CSA in which a bid equal to b is submitted.
Next, suppose that the three chopsticks are sold in the simultaneous ascending auction
with an activity rule that forces bidders to be active on at most the same number of objects
as in the previous round. In that case, it is an equilibrium to bid ￿straightforwardly￿ ,6
i.e. when submitting a bid, to bid the minimum price and to make sure to be active
on exactly two objects, and to abstain from bidding when a speci￿c price is reached.
It does not make sense to submit a bid on only one license while not being active on
4See e.g. Binmore and Swierzbinski (2000).
5See, e.g., McMillan (1994) and Van Damme (2002).
6B￿rgers and Dustman (2005).
4another. Neither is it worth bidding on three objects as a third object is of no additional
value. Finally, submitting di⁄erent bids on di⁄erent objects against a bidder who is
bidding straightforwardly is not pro￿table. It is readily veri￿ed that a bidder is strictly
better o⁄ by bidding the lowest of the two bids on both objects. If both bidders bid
straightforwardly up to an amount b, the same outcome results (in terms of prices and
allocation) as they would bid b in CSA (abstracting from small deviations caused by a
strictly positive minimum bid increment).
Another auction that is closely related to CSA (but rarely used in practice) is the
all-pay auction. Suppose one object is sold. In the auction, bidders independently submit
a sealed bid. The highest bidder wins the object but all bidders must pay their bid,
even those who do not win the object. Note that bidders face the exposure problem
here: the losing bidders fail to win the object but still has to pay a positive price. In
laboratory experiments, Davis and Reilly (1998), Potters et al. (1998), and Noussair
and Silver (2006) observe that subjects bid more in the all-pay auction than what would
be expected in equilibrium with risk neutral bidders. This observations suggests that
the exposure problem may be non-existent, at least not in terms of revenue. Barut et
al. (2002), in an experiment that is closely related to ours, extend this result to all-pay
auctions with multiple objects. The main di⁄erence with their design and ours is twofold.
First, in our design, the losing bidder only pays half of her bid. Second, in CSA, the
winner pays the second highest bid instead of her own.
In section 2, we study the theoretical properties of CSA and SPSB.7 We ￿nd that
CSA has an e¢ cient Bayesian Nash equilibrium. From standard auction theory we learn
that SPSB has an e¢ cient equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies in which each bidder
submits a bid equal to half her value for each chopstick. The revenue equivalence theorem
(Myerson, 1981) then implies that CSA is revenue equivalent with SPSB. In other words,
in this theoretical setting, auctions in which the exposure problem is present perform as
7See Onderstal (2002) for a more detailed theoretical investigation of the chopstick auction.
5well as auctions in which it is not. That makes this setting a useful benchmark to test
the two claims we started with.
In section 3, we describe the experimental design and discuss the results of the exper-
iment. We used an ￿ABA-BAB￿design, i.e., half of the subjects played CSA in the ￿rst
30 rounds, followed by SPSB, and CSA again, while it was the other way around for the
other half. This design allows us to explore whether CSA and SPSB produce di⁄erent
outcomes and furthermore, whether such di⁄erences are robust with respect to learning.
We obtain the following results. First, in the ￿rst two phases of the experiment, rev-
enue tends to be higher when bidders are confronted with the exposure problem than if
they are not. This is in contrast to the third phase, in which CSA and SPSB do not di⁄er
statistically in terms of generated revenue. Our second ￿nding is that SPSB is signi￿-
cantly more e¢ cient than CSA in all phases. Our third observation may seem somewhat
surprising: in SPSB, the average revenue was about 20% above revenue that would be
generated if all bidders bid half their value (the unique weakly dominant strategy). This
￿nding is robust across phases and across rounds and it is in contrast to what is found in
experiments by Kagel et al. (1987), Kagel and Levin (1993), and Harstad (2000) on the
￿standard￿second-price sealed-bid auction. In these experiments, the average revenue
was only about 10% above the dominant strategy.8 A possible explanation of this result
is that we have complicated the game somewhat: when winning, a bidder has to pay twice
the second highest bid, once for each chopstick. This is di⁄erent than what happens in
the usual second-price sealed-bid auction, in which the winner pays the second highest bid
only once. This framing e⁄ect shows that even a slight complication of the environment
may make it harder for people to act rationally.
We conclude that our experiment gives a convincing reason why the advice ￿avoid the
exposure problem￿should be added to Klemperer￿ s list of practical issues in the design of
auctions. With experienced bidders, CSA yields the same revenue as SPSB but performs
8See Kagel (1995) for an overview of laboratory experiments on the second-price sealed-bid auction.
6worse in terms of e¢ ciency.
2 Theory
Consider a situation with 2 bidders, labelled 1 and 2, who wish to eat Chinese food.
However, none of the bidders has anything to eat with. Suppose that a seller sells 3
chopsticks in the chopstick auction (CSA) which has the following rules. The price starts
at zero and is continuously raised. Bidders have the opportunity to leave the auction at
any price they desire. The auction ends when one bidder quits. She wins one chopstick
and pays the price at which she leaves. The remaining bidder wins two chopsticks and
pays two times the price at which the second highest bidder has quit. If there is a tie, the
winner of the auction is determined by tossing a fair coin.







where vi is a private signal for bidder i. In words, a bidder attaches a value of vi to
winning two chopsticks and no value to winning only one chopstick or to winning a third
one. We assume that the vi￿ s are drawn independently from the same smooth distribution
function F with density function f. We assume that f(w) > 0 for all w 2 [0;1].
Each bidder is risk neutral. In other words, if the price realized in CSA is equal to p,






s = 1 :
Observe that CSA is strategically equivalent to the following sealed-bid auction. The
highest bidder, let￿ s say i, wins an object with value vi and pays twice the bid of the other
7bidder. The other bidder receives nothing, but pays his bid once. We use this sealed-bid
version in our laboratory experiment.
Proposition 1 gives equilibrium bidding in CSA. We can use Baye et al.￿ s (1998)
analysis to construct the equilibrium bid function because CSA is a special case of their
general linear model of contests. Baye et al. derive a di⁄erential equation from which the
equilibrium bid function is uniquely determined.
Proposition 1 Let B(v), the bid of a bidder with signal v, be given by






Then B is the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of CSA. The outcome of the
auction is e¢ cient. The bidder with the lowest possible value obtains zero utility.
Proof. See the appendix.
Let us compare the outcomes of CSA with the second-price sealed-bid auction in
which two chopsticks are sold as one bundle (SPSB). Proposition 2 gives the equilibrium
properties of SPSB.





Then b is the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies
of SPSB. The outcome of the auction is e¢ cient. The bidder with the lowest possible
value obtains zero utility.
Proof. Standard.
8Propositions 1 and 2 show that both auctions are e¢ cient. In other words, a seller
who is concerned about e¢ ciency is indi⁄erent between the two auction types.
Moreover, both auctions turn out to be revenue equivalent, and generate the same
expected utility for the bidders. This is a direct consequence of the revenue equivalence
theorem (Myerson, 1981), using the following two observations. First, both CSA and
SPSB are auctions of a single object, namely a set of two chopsticks. Second, according
to Propositions 1 and 2, both auctions are e¢ cient and the utility of the bidder with
the lowest possible value is equal to zero. The interpretation of this revenue equivalence
result is that a risk neutral seller interested in revenue is indi⁄erent between using CSA
and SPSB to sell the chopsticks. Proposition 3 summarizes this ￿nding.
Proposition 3 Suppose that bidders play CSA and SPSB according to the strategies given
in Propositions 1 and 2 respectively. Then the auctions are revenue equivalent and the
bidders expect the same utility in both auctions.
Proof. Standard.
3 Laboratory experiment
We present the results of our laboratory experiment in four parts. In the ￿rst part,
we describe the experimental design. Part two presents total revenue generated by the
auctions. In the third part, we focus on e¢ ciency. In the ￿nal part, we analyze bidding
behavior.
93.1 Experimental design
In a computerized laboratory experiment, we studied CSA and SPSB in a setting that is
closely related to the theoretical setting.9 The main di⁄erences are the following. First of
all, the subjects in the lab were confronted with the sealed-bid version of CSA. Subjects
did not see the price rise until one of them indicated to leave the auction. Instead,
subjects were asked at which price they would desire to quit. However, the two games
are strategically equivalent, so that we do not expect any di⁄erences in the outcomes.10
Secondly, we approximated the continuous signal and bidding spaces with ￿ne grids.
Thirdly, values were drawn according to a uniform distribution on a grid between 0 and
100 with 1 as the smallest step. Our theoretical results have been based on the assumption
that bidders draw their signals from the interval [0,100]. Finally, subjects could choose
prices from a ￿nite grid between 0 and 999, with 1 as the smallest step. The theory has
been based on the assumption that bidders can choose their bids from a continuous action
space. However, both grids are su¢ ciently ￿ne to approximate the continuous signal and
action space.
The experiments were conducted at Harvard Business School in December 2005 and
January 2006. We had 96 subjects participating in four sessions. We used an ABA-
BAB design, i.e., in two sessions, 48 subjects played CSA in the ￿rst phase, SPSB in the
second, and again CSA in the third, and 48 subjects played the other way around in the
other two sessions. In all sessions, the subjects were separated in groups of four. Each
phase consisted of three practice periods and 30 paid trading periods. Before the start of
each period, the subjects were randomly re-matched to another player in their group of
four, resulting in 12 independent observations per treatment. In each period, all subjects
drew a new value for two chopsticks. At the beginning of each session, subjects read the
9The experiment has been programmed and conducted with the software Z-tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
10Still, we should be somewhat cautious, as ￿framing e⁄ects￿may occur. For instance, in experiments
by Coppinger et al. (1980) and Cox et al. (1982), the ￿rst-price sealed-bid auction turned out to generate
higher prices than the Dutch auction, despite the fact that both games are strategically equivalent.
10instructions (see the appendix). Questions were answered privately.
Subjects were paid a lump sum transfer of $10 for showing up and an additional reward
equivalent to their earnings during the auctions.11 They earned ECU (Experimental Cur-
rency Units) which were calculated as the di⁄erence between the value of the chopsticks
they won minus the price they paid. In order to accommodate losses, subjects received
the equivalent of $3 in ECU at the beginning of each phase.12 Points were exchanged into
cash according to the exchange rate
100 ECU = $1.
In CSA, the winner of just one chopstick gets a negative score equal to the amount he
paid for it. The maximum score in a period is 100 points, i.e., the maximum value (100)
minus the minimum payment (0). Subjects earned $26 on average in approximately 2
hours (including $10 for showing up on time and an additional payment of $3 at the start
of each phase).
3.2 Results: revenue
What is the average revenue in the auctions? In CSA, revenue equals three times the
price: the winner of two chopsticks pays this price twice, the winner of one chopstick
once. In SPSB, revenue is equal to twice the price. See ￿gure 1 for the average revenue
in each phase.
[Insert Figure 1 about Here]
11Paying every period as we did induces behavior towards risk neutrality. Paying according to one
randomly selected period, instead, may increase subjects￿ willingness to take risks (Davis and Holt,
1993).
12If subjects managed to lose all their running balance, a screen would pop up informing that the
upfront money was to be used to cover further losses. Subjects did not object to that. Only one subject
managed to lose even her show-up fee. In this case we injected some money in her account ($5). She
managed to earn $7 after bankrupting. Excluding her group from the data analysis does not qualitative
change our ￿ndings.
11Result 1 In the CSA treatments that took place in phases 1 and 2 [3], revenue was
higher than [the same as] predicted by the theory.13
Inexperienced subjects, i.e., subjects that did not play CSA in earlier phases, turned
out to pay much more than predicted by the theory. Given the realized values in the
experiment, the average revenue would have been about 33 points per period if bidders
had bid according to the bid function in Proposition 1. In reality, the average revenue
was 72.6 [50.2] points in the ￿rst [second] phase.
Result 2 In all phases, SPSB yields more revenue than predicted by the theory.14
For SPSB, the theory predicts that revenue would have been about 33 points on
average per period. In all three phases of the experiment, average revenue was equal to
about 20% more than the theoretical prediction. A possible explanation of this result is
that we have complicated the game somewhat: when winning, a bidder has to pay twice
the second highest bid, once for each chopstick. This is di⁄erent than what happens in
the ￿usual￿second-price sealed-bid auction, in which the winner pays the second highest
bid only once. Overbidding in SPSB may be driven by this framing. This result turns
out to be robust in the sense that overbidding is still present in the third phase.
Result 3 In the treatments that took place in phases 1 and 2, CSA yields more revenue
than SPSB. The revenues are not statistically di⁄erent in phase 3.15
13A two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test (using average revenue within the 12 matching groups and
phases as inpedendent unit of observation) generates p-values of 0.002, 0.002, and 0.938 respectively for
phases 1, 2, and 3.
14The two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test generates p-values of 0.002, 0.038, and 0.002 respectively for
phases 1, 2, and 3.
15The two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test generates p-values of 0.000, 0.003, and 0.119 respectively for
phases 1, 2, and 3.
12Our third result is the striking di⁄erence between the obtained revenue in CSA and
SPSB in the ￿rst two phases of the experiment, which disappears in the third phase. In
the case of inexperienced bidders, revenue tends to be (much) higher when bidders are
confronted with the exposure problem than if they are not. Learning seems practically
absent in SPSB: overbidding is consistent within and between phases. Subjects do learn
when playing CSA in the sense that over time, revenue decreases to the equilibrium level.
It seems that subjects only realize after playing SPSB that they should bid more cautiously
in CSA. Indeed, within subject comparisons reveal that there is no statistical di⁄erence
between the revenue in SPSB in one phase and in CSA in the next.16 At the end of this
section, we discuss to which extent bidding converges to the equilibrium strategies.
Result 3 shows that subjects learn. In the case of inexperienced bidders, revenue tends
to be (much) higher when bidders are confronted with the exposure problem than if they
are not. However, this di⁄erence disappears in the last phase of our experiment. The
reasons behind learning are two-fold. First, subjects learn from experience, i.e., subjects
learn from a game something relevant for the same game. Second, subjects are able to
do ￿transfer learning￿(i.e., subjects learn from a game something relevant for another;
see, Cooper and Kagel 2003). An OLS regression illustrates that both learning modes
are relevant in our experiment (see Table 1 for the results). The regression estimates the
revenue on the treatment variable and considers various time e⁄ects.17
[Insert Table 1 about Here]
The dummies CSA’ denote the treatment variables for phases ’ = 1;2;3. With
16p = 0:272 [p = 0:530] from phase 1 [2] to phase 2 [3] (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The
other way around: there is a statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between the revenue in CSA in a phase
and SPSB in the following: p = 0:002 [p = 0:028] from phase 1 [2] to phase 2 [3] (two-sided Wilcoxon
signed-rank test).
17The regression includes dummies for each subject. Robust standard errors are calculated to account
for statistical dependence within matching groups.
13respect to phase ’, CSA’ = 1 for treatment CSA, and CSA’ = 1 for treatment SPSB.
The estimated coe¢ cients con￿rm that CSA generates higher revenues in phases 1 and 2.
Again, revenue is not signi￿cantly higher for CSA in phase 3. CSA’xPERIOD’ interacts
the treatment e⁄ect with relevant period within a phase (PERIOD’ = 1;2;:::;30 in phase
’ and PERIOD’ = 0 otherwise). For phase 1, the estimated negative coe¢ cient of this
variable indicates that revenue in CSA decreases faster from one period to the next than
in SPSB. In contrast, the overall time trend is insigni￿cant. This means that subjects in
CSA learn from experience whereas subjects in SPSB do not. The estimated coe¢ cients
of all other period variables are statistically insigni￿cant: apart from CSA in phase 1,
there is no overall time trend. This means that we only observe experience learning in
CSA in phase 1. Because subjects who started out in SPSB have no prior experience with
CSA, this means that subjects engage in transfer learning.
3.3 Results: e¢ ciency
E¢ ciency is de￿ned as follows
E¢ ciency =
value of the winning bidder
maxfv1;v2g
.
Propositions 1 and 2 predict that both auctions are 100% e¢ cient. In a worst case
scenario, if the two chopsticks are assigned using a lottery, expected e¢ ciency equals
75%.18 Figure 2 includes the average e¢ ciency across auctions and phases. In CSA, we
18The calculation for this number is the following. As both bidders are ex ante symmetric, we may
assume without loss of generality, that the lottery always assigns two chopsticks to bidder 1. Expected
e¢ ciency is then given by

























The ￿rst term in the inner integral refers to the case that bidder 2 has a higher value than bidder 1 (so
that e¢ ciency equals v1
v2). In the second term, bidder 1 has the higher value (so that e¢ ciency equals 1).
14observe an average e¢ ciency equal to 89% in all phases. This number is roughly as close
to the e¢ ciency of a lottery (75%) and an e¢ cient outcome (100%). For SPSB, e¢ ciency
was about 95% in each phase. The e¢ ciency of SPSB is much closer to the theoretical
prediction of 100% than the outcome of a lottery. We conclude that
Result 4 SPSB is more e¢ cient than CSA.19
[Insert Figure 2 about Here]
3.4 Results: bidding behavior
Let us take a closer look at bidding behavior to examine why the experimental outcomes
in terms of revenue and e¢ ciency deviate from the theory, even after subjects had ample
opportunity to learn.
Table 2 gives a summary of bidding behavior in CSA in the third phase. We have con-
structed this table as follows. For every bidder, we have calculated the absolute di⁄erence
between her actual bids and six bidding strategies: the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, ￿bid-
ding half your value￿ , ￿bidding value￿ , ￿always bid zero￿ , a step function with bids equal
to zero [￿fty] for values below [above] 50, and a step function with bids equal to zero [100
or more] for values below [above] 50. Table 3 shows which of these bidding strategies has
the lowest average absolute di⁄erence with the actual bids. When the average di⁄erence
was more than 20, we classi￿ed the bidding strategy as ￿other￿ . It turns out that simple
strategies like ￿bidding half your value￿ , bidding zero, and step functions are far more
employed than the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Still, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is
the best predictor among the six bidding strategies if we aggregate all bids in the third
19The two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test generates p-values of 0.002, 0.028, and 0.009 for phases 1, 2,
and 3 respectively. Also within subject comparisons reveal a statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence: p = 0:005
[p = 0:008; p = 0:002; p = 0:029] for CSA in phase 1 [2;2;3] and SPSB in phase 2 [1;3;2] (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test).
15phase. The average absolute di⁄erence between the equilibrium bids and the true bids
is 29.4. Ine¢ ciencies arise because bidders employ di⁄erent strategies and some of these
strategies are not strictly increasing in value.
[Insert Table 2 about Here]
Subjects may have good reasons to deviate from the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash equi-
librium in CSA. First, the best response to an opponent bidding his value is to always
bid 0, which could explain why this strategy is a good proxy of the strategies followed by
15% of the bidders. Second, the best response for bidder i to bidder j bidding
vj
2 is to bid
0 for vi < 50 and (more than) 100 otherwise, a strategy that was also followed by 15% of
the subjects. Both observations suggest that a substantial number of bidders may have
in mind that other bidders use these simple linear bidding strategies.
Bidding in SPSB appears to be much closer to the theoretical prediction. According
to table 3, in the third phase, the far majority of subjects follows a bidding strategy that
is close to the equilibrium strategy of ￿bidding half your value￿ . Still, there is quite some
overbidding: about 33% of the bids exceeds the equilibrium bid by more than 10%. This
explains why revenue is higher and e¢ ciency lower than predicted by the theory.
[Insert Table 3 about Here]
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the e⁄ect of the exposure problem on bidding behavior
in auctions. With respect to revenue we have shown that inexperienced bidders strongly
su⁄er from the exposure problem in CSA. In phase 1 of our experiment, revenues from
CSA are 58 percent higher than in SPSB. However, we have also found signi￿cant learning
16e⁄ects. If bidders who are experienced in one trading institution in phase 1 are confronted
with the other one in phase 2 (e.g., those who traded in SPSB, now trade in CSA), the
negative e⁄ects of the exposure problem are much weaker than before. Therefore, subjects
seem to engage in ￿transfer learning￿(Cooper and Kagel, 2003). Finally, when trading
is repeated under constant conditions in phase 3, the exposure problem ceases to have
signi￿cant e⁄ects on revenue. With respect to e¢ ciency our results are less optimistic:
CSA is less e¢ cient than SPSB and this result is robust to learning.
These results do not necessarily mean that the government should always avoid the
exposure problem. In the case that the government does not have the necessary infor-
mation as to how to put together su¢ ciently large licenses, it may consider splitting up
supply in small licenses and ￿leave it to the market￿how bidders put together packages
of licences. The bidders could sort out themselves how many units they need to secure
su¢ cient surplus. Depending on the shape of demand, the government may then design
an auction in which the exposure problem is present. Our experiment has shown that this
need not have a detrimental e⁄ect on revenue, but that the outcome is more likely to be
ine¢ cient.
17A Appendix
This appendix contains the proof of proposition 1 and instructions for the experiment.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let B be a symmetric equilibrium bid function. Suppose B is strictly increasing. If the
other bidder bids according to B, the expected utility of a bidder with signal v who bids




(v ￿ 2B (x))dF(x) ￿ (1 ￿ F(w))B (w):
The ￿rst [second] term of the RHS refers to the case that the bidder makes the [second]
highest bid. The FOC of the equilibrium is
@U(v;w)
@w
= (v ￿ 2B (w))f(w) ￿ (1 ￿ F(w))B
0 (w) + f(w)B (w) = 0 (2)














= sign(v ￿ w).




























Is the readily veri￿ed that the integration constant C = 0, so that (1) follows. Uniqueness
follows from a standard argument (see e.g., Bulow et al. 1999).
18A.2 Instructions for the experiment
These are instructions for treatment SPSB-CSA-SPSB. The ones for the
CSA-SPSB-CSA-treatment are similar.
General information
You are taking part in an economics experiment. If you have questions, please raise
your hand. We will gladly answer your questions individually. From now until the end of
the session, unauthorized communication of any kind between participants is not allowed.
It is very important that you follow this rule. Otherwise the results of the experiment
will be of no value from a scienti￿c perspective. Please do not use the computer for any
other purpose than participating in this study. Also, please turn o⁄ your cell phones.
The purpose of the experiment is to analyze decision behavior in markets.
You will receive a show up fee of $10. If you carefully read the instructions and follow
the rules you can earn additional money during the experiment. In this experiment you
earn ECU (Experimental Currency Units). ECU will be converted to dollars with at a
rate of
1 ECU = 1 cent.
Your ￿nal payo⁄consists of the initial $10 given to you at the beginning of the experiment
and the money you earn in the course of the experiment. You will be paid immediately
after the experiment in cash. The experiment consists of three phases.
19Detailed instructions Phases I and III
In this experiment each participant is a buyer. You and one other buyer will participate
in an auction in order to obtain units of a good. There are two possible outcomes. Either
you obtain one unit, or you obtain two units. If you obtain only one unit, this is
of no value for you. If you obtain two units, they will have a positive value
(valuation) for you.
To illustrate this situation, suppose you want to have Chinese food and need chopsticks
to eat it. While one chopstick is of no use whatsoever, with two chopsticks you can have
your meal. However, as people are not always equally hungry the valuation will not be
always the same. Actually, that valuation is a randomly determined integer between 0 and
100, that is, each number between 0 and 100 is equally likely to occur. Your valuation is
private information, i.e. neither you know the other buyer￿ s valuation nor does the other
buyer know your valuation.
Each buyer is informed of his or her own valuation and then asked to submit a bid.
The one who submitted the higher bid is called the winner and buys two units
of the good. The buyer who submitted the lower bid gets one (worthless) unit
for free. Only the winner pays the price for each of its two units. This price
equals the lower of the two submitted bids. If the two bids are the same the
winner is randomly determined; that is, each buyer is equally likely to be the
winner. The price and your valuation determine what you earn or lose.
If you are the winner, i.e. you submitted the higher bid, you buy two units. These
units have a positive value for you but you have to pay the price for each of them, i.e.
you earn a number of ECU equal to your valuation minus two times the price (the other￿ s
bid that is lower than yours). If you submitted the lower bid you get one useless unit for
free. This is of no value for you but you do not have to pay the price (your submitted
bid) for this unit. Summarizing, if you are the winner you get two units, therefore:
20pro￿t = valuation (valuation is the value of two units for you) ￿2*price (price is
the bid of the other participant)
If you are not the winner you get one unit, therefore:
pro￿t = 0 (the value of one unit for you is 0) ￿0 (you get one unit for free) = 0
The experiment consists of 3 trial periods and 30 trading periods.
The 3 trial periods will not account for your ￿nal earnings. In these trial periods
you are going to be informed of your valuation and asked to submit a bid. However, in
the trial periods you are not going to be matched with another real buyer. Instead, the
computer is going to randomly generate the other buyer￿ s bid. In a second screen you are
going to be informed of the other￿ s bid. To check your understanding of the auction rules
you will have to answer some questions in this screen. Once your answers are correct
you will be able to proceed. In order to make your life easier you are allowed to use
a calculator which will pop up by clicking the button in the lower right corner of your
screen.
After 3 trial periods there will come 30 trading periods. You are going to start the
trading periods with 300ECU in your account. In the trading periods you are going to be
informed of your valuation and asked to submit a bid. On each of the trading periods you
are going to be randomly matched with another buyer. This will be another participant
in this room. You will never know whom you are matched with. In every period you and
every other buyer are assigned new valuations for obtaining two units of the good. Note
that your valuation is very likely to di⁄er from other buyers￿valuations. After everybody
submits their bids you will see the results at the bottom of the screen. There you can
21check for every period your valuation, your bid, the other￿ s bid, the price per unit, your
pro￿t, and your accumulated pro￿ts in this phase.
Good Luck!
Detailed instructions Phase II
In this experiment each participant is a buyer. You and one other buyer will participate
in an auction in order to obtain units of a good. There are two possible outcomes. Either
you obtain one unit, or you obtain two units. If you obtain only one unit, this is
of no value for you. If you obtain two units, they will have a positive value
(valuation) for you.
To illustrate this situation, suppose you want to have Chinese food and need chopsticks
to eat it. While one chopstick is of no use whatsoever, with two chopsticks you can have
your meal. However, as people are not always equally hungry the valuation will not be
always the same. Actually, that valuation is a randomly determined integer between 0 and
100, that is, each number between 0 and 100 is equally likely to occur. Your valuation is
private information, i.e. neither you know the other buyer￿ s valuation nor does the other
buyer know your valuation.
Each buyer is informed of his or her own valuation and then asked to submit a bid.
The one who submitted the higher bid is called the winner and buys two units
of the good. The buyer who submitted the lower bid has to buy one unit. For
every unit you buy, you have to pay its price. This price equals the lower of
the two submitted bids. If the two bids are the same the winner is randomly
determined; that is, each buyer is equally likely to be the winner. The price
and your valuation determine what you earn or lose.
If you are the winner, i.e. you submitted the higher bid, you buy two units. These
22units have a positive value for you but you have to pay the price for each of them, i.e.
you earn a number of ECU equal to your valuation minus two times the price (the other￿ s
bid that is lower than yours). If you submitted the lower bid you buy only one unit. This
is of no value for you but you have to pay the price (your submitted bid) for this unit.
Summarizing, if you are the winner you get two units, therefore:
pro￿t = valuation (valuation is the value of two units for you) ￿2*price (price is
the bid of the other participant)
If you are not the winner you get one unit, therefore:
pro￿t = 0 (the value of one unit for you is 0) ￿price (if you are not the winner the
price is your bid)
The experiment consists of 3 trial periods and 30 trading periods.
The 3 trial periods will not account for your ￿nal earnings. In these trial periods
you are going to be informed of your valuation and asked to submit a bid. However, in
the trial periods you are not going to be matched with another real buyer. Instead, the
computer is going to randomly generate the other buyer￿ s bid. In a second screen you are
going to be informed of the other￿ s bid. To check your understanding of the auction rules
you will have to answer some questions in this screen. Once your answers are correct
you will be able to proceed. In order to make your life easier you are allowed to use
a calculator which will pop up by clicking the button in the lower right corner of your
screen.
After 3 trial periods there will come 30 trading periods. You are going to start the
23trading periods with 300ECU in your account. In the trading periods you are going to be
informed of your valuation and asked to submit a bid. On each of the trading periods you
are going to be randomly matched with another buyer. This will be another participant
in this room. You will never know whom you are matched with. In every period you and
every other buyer are assigned new valuations for obtaining two units of the good. Note
that your valuation is very likely to di⁄er from other buyers￿valuations. After everybody
submits their bids you will see the results at the bottom of the screen. There you can
check for every period your valuation, your bid, the other￿ s bid, the price per unit, your
pro￿t, and your accumulated pro￿ts in this phase.
Good Luck!
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28Tables and ￿gures
Figure 1: revenue in CSA and SPSB.
Figure 2: e¢ ciency in CSA and SPSB.
29Constant 33.524 (16.470) **
CSA1 50.137 (5.619) ***
PERIOD1 0.110 (0.085)
CSA1xPERIOD1 -1.026 (0.308) ***








Table 1: Estimates of the panel data regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** (**) [*] indicates statistical signi￿cance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.
bid strategy B(vit) 1
2vit vit 0 step(0,50) step(0,￿100) other
8% 31% 8% 15% 8% 15% 15%
Table 2: The approximate bid strategies in CSA. vit is the value of subject i in period
t and B(vit) is the theoretical prediction.
￿ 1 ￿ 2 ￿ 5 ￿ 10
46% 52% 65% 77%
Table 3: Fraction of subjects in SPSB for whom the average absolute di⁄erence between
the actual bids and the unique weakly dominant strategy does not exceed the given
number.
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